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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2010, the United States spent more than $2.5 trillion on healthcare.  To put this 
in perspective, the U.S. spent a larger share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on health, 
17.9%, and a larger average amount per person, $8,362, than any other country in the 
world.1  (The runners up were the Netherlands, at 12% of GDP, and Norway, at $5,388 
per person.)2  The OECD-member average is 9.5% of GDP and $3,265 per person.3  So, 
even compared only to developed nations, the expenditure on health, both public and 
private, in the U.S. is stunning.   
  Yet the U.S. does not receive returns in proportion to this expense.  In 2000, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) ranked the overall healthcare systems of 191 
countries; the U.S., spending 13.7% of GDP on health at the time, managed to beat out 
Slovenia for 37th place.4  The top two ranked countries, France and Italy, spent only 10% 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 World Health Organization, “United States of America,” available from 
http://www.who.int/countries/usa/en/, accessed 27 November 2012.  
 
2 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Health policies and data: 
OECD Health Data 2012 – Frequently Requested Data,” available from 
http://www.oecd.org/health/healthpoliciesanddata/oecdhealthdata2012.htm, accessed 27 
November 2012. 
 
3 Ibid. 
 
4 World Health Organization, “The World Health Report 2000 – Health Systems: 
Improving Performance,” available from http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/whr00_en.pdf, 
accessed 27 November 2012, 153-155.  
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and 8% of GDP respectively.5  In infant mortality, adult morality, and life expectancy, the 
U.S. ranked between 36th and 43rd place.6  An estimated 91,000 premature deaths each 
year could have been prevented if the U.S. were able to match the best-performing 
countries in terms of timely and effective care.7 
 The vast majority of developed nations offer universal healthcare, usually through 
a publicly funded insurance program – the U.S. is one among very few exceptions, none 
of which received high rankings for their healthcare systems.8  While 31% of Americans 
are covered by some form of government health insurance such as Medicare or Medicaid 
(for 19.7% of Americans, this is their only form of insurance), 49.9 million people, or 
16.3% of the population, are without health insurance.  Both the absolute number of 
people who are uninsured as well as the percent of the overall population have been 
rising steadily since 2001.  The remaining 64% of the population is covered by private 
health insurance, the overwhelming majority of this being through an employer.9   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid. and OECD.   
 
6 Christopher J.L. Murray and Julio Frenk, “Ranking 37th – Measuring the Performance 
of the U.S. Health Care System,” The New England Journal of Medicine 2010, available from 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0910064, accessed on 26 November 2012.   
 
7 The Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health System, “Why 
Not the Best?  Results from the National Scorecard on U.S. Health System Performance, 2011,” 
available from http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2011/Oct/Why-
Not-the-Best-2011.aspx?page=all, accessed 27 November 2012. 
  
8 Max Fisher, “Here’s a Map of the Countries That Provide Universal Health Care 
(America’s Still Not on It), The Atlantic, available from 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/heres-a-map-of-the-countries-that-
provide-universal-health-care-americas-still-not-on-it/259153/, accessed 1 December 2012. 
 
9 The U.S. Census Bureau, “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the 
United States: 2010,” available from http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf, 
accessed 20 November 2012, 23-24, 29.   
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The state of affairs in terms of U.S. healthcare is a scary one; we are facing 
rapidly rising costs, as well as a growing population of people who are without any kind 
of health insurance.  The federal reform of the healthcare system of 2010, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), aims to reverse both of those trends, 
though many of the changes will take several years to implement and have an effect.  
Furthermore, while the PPACA tackles a substantial amount of much-needed reform, it is 
not clear that it will be able to address some of the largest, most systematic problems 
within our healthcare system: an employer-based insurance system, where insurance 
companies are private and for-profit, individuals rarely have choice beyond the limited 
options their employer provides and usually do not pay on a per-procedure basis, 
incentivizing an over-consumption of care and procedures. 
Why on earth, then, do we continue to subscribe to this system?  Why not convert 
to any one of the hybrid systems already shown by fellow developed nations to provide 
better outcomes at lower cost, while also extending coverage to all Americans?  One 
common justification seems to be, at its core, a bias against redistributionism.  While 
infamously criticized as untrue on many counts, and dismissed by Mitt Romney as 
inconsequential to his election campaign, his 47% comment – that 47% of Americans 
would vote to re-elect President Obama because they are people “who are dependent 
upon government… who believe the government has a responsibility to care for them, 
who believe that they are entitled to health care, to food, to housing, to you-name-it”10 – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Lucy Madison, “Fact-checking Romney’s ‘47 percent’ comment,” CBS News, available 
from http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57515033-503544/fact-checking-romneys-47-
percent-comment/, accessed 20 November 2012. 
4 
brought to the forefront of this country’s conversation the idea that too many people are 
net receivers.  
On perhaps a higher level of political discourse, earlier this year the Supreme 
Court heard arguments on the constitutionality of the PPACA, including the individual 
mandate that required virtually every American to purchase health insurance.  (While this 
requirement brings the U.S. closer to the universal coverage that exists in the rest of the 
developed world, it still does not provide for a publicly funded insurance option.)  The 
key issue in the case was whether or not it is within the powers of Congress – either as a 
regulation of commerce or an imposition of a tax – to compel Americans to buy health 
insurance against their will, i.e. with threat of financial penalty.  While the mandate was 
ultimately found to be constitutional, a minority of four justices was still convinced that 
such a requirement was an overreach of government, an imposition on the liberty of 
individuals to choose to not buy healthcare.   
 We as Americans have long been concerned and fascinated with the concept of 
liberty; today we are using it to explain why the wealthy do not have to pay so that the 
poor may receive healthcare, and why those who do not want health insurance are free to 
abstain.  We appeal to liberty as the reason why we don’t have a universal coverage, 
publicly funded system of healthcare.  This paper aims to examine and evaluate the 
plausibility of this justification. 
Many arguments for high levels of state intervention in healthcare appeal to 
access as a right.  The preamble to the Constitution of the WHO reads: “The enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every 
5 
human being.”11  Similarly, the United Nations issued a General Comment in 2000 
stating: “Health is a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other 
human rights.  Every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity.”12  Neither of these assertions of a 
right to healthcare addresses the obvious tension such a right would have with the 
conception of individual liberty: even if I have a right to access a certain level of care, in 
the case that I cannot afford it, it is not clear who has a responsibility to pay.  To what 
extent is a right to healthcare justifiable?  To what extent can others be obligated to 
contribute to my ability to access sufficient care?  Can this obligation be consistent with 
the individual liberty we prize so highly? 
 It must be said that there are many, many practically and philosophically 
compelling issues surrounding global health as well.  There are many people all around 
the world who have much lower expectations of health than those in the U.S., and for 
whom significant marginal improvements in health could be achieved at much lower 
cost.  It is essential that we understand what our obligations are to these individuals in 
terms of healthcare, and work to achieve them as effectively as possible.  However, the 
topic of rights, duties and justifiable schemes of healthcare is a large and complicated 
one.  I have focused the scope of this paper to healthcare obligations within a single state, 
such as the U.S. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 World Health Organization, “Constitution of the World Health Organization,” 
available from http://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/constitution-en.pdf, accessed 3 November 
2012.  
 
12 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, “Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: General 
Comment No. 14 (2000),” available from 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.En, accessed 3 November 2012.  
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 This paper investigates the relationship between liberty and healthcare from 
several different perspectives.  Chapter I examines an account of liberty on the condition 
of equal freedom.  Chapter II grants the specifically libertarian approach to liberty, which 
entails inviolable rights of ownership.  Chapter III further accepts the right-libertarian 
interpretation of property acquisition and ownership.  Furthermore, each section 
considers the implications of the particular theory of justice, in particular what kinds of 
moral constraints and obligations it places on our system of healthcare. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN ACCOUNT OF LIBERTY ON THE CONDITION OF EQUAL FREEDOM 
 
 Immanuel Kant, an 18th century philosopher, developed a theory of morality and 
an account of a justified state based on the fundamental idea that every individual is 
entitled to be his or her own master; all persons are at liberty to choose what purposes 
they will pursue with the means available to them.  This liberty, however, is not – and 
cannot be – absolute.  As Arthur Ripstein, a contemporary philosopher, writes in 
explanation of Kant’s philosophy: “A world in which liberty alone is protected is one in 
which nobody is secure from the acts of others; a world in which security alone is 
protected is a world in which nobody is free to act for fear of injuring others.”1  I am not 
entitled to do unconditionally what I want, for this would threaten completely the security 
of others.  Any plausible account of liberty must therefore give rise to the reasonable 
conditions of liberty – an explanation of why it is not a justifiable exercise of my freedom 
to run amok, murdering others at random.   
 Kant’s account qualifies liberty as follows: “Freedom (independence from being 
constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other 
in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Arthur Ripstein, Equality Responsibility and the Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 6. 
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being by virtue of his humanity.”2  Thus every individual is inherently entitled to a 
certain amount of freedom, which is limited by the right of every other individual to the 
same –the condition of equal freedom.  A corollary of this innate right is the Universal 
Principle of Right, which “demands that each person exercise his or her choice in ways 
that are consistent with the freedom of all others to exert their choice.”3  This 
understanding of liberty gives individuals the right to not be subject to the choices of any 
other individual: 
Your right to be your own master entails that no other person is entitled to 
decide for you that the benefits you will receive from some arrangement 
are sufficient to force you to participate in it.  You alone are entitled to 
decide whether a benefit to you is worth the burden it brings.  Nor can 
others justify authority over you, or use force against you, on the ground 
that the restrictions thereby placed on you will generate greater benefits 
for others.4  
 
The essence of what it means to be your own master, in the Kantian account, consists of 
the ability to choose which purposes you want to pursue given your available means.  A 
complete account of independence also includes the freedom to use available things for 
the pursuit of chosen purposes, though this private property right must again be 
compatible with the equal rights of all other individuals to use their things for their 
purposes. 
It is essential to emphasize that individuals are not entitled to any particular 
outcomes from their pursuits – to use Ripstein’s example, that someone else took the last 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Right, Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals in Practical 
Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:237.   
 
3 Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 35-6. 
 
4 Ibid., 5. 
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container of milk from the store means only that they have frustrated your intended plan 
to buy milk, not that they have somehow interfered with your independence.  Others, in 
the rightful exercise of their liberty, may make choices whose effects in turn disadvantage 
you.  To have otherwise would be an unacceptable limitation of their freedom: “To 
insulate one person from all effects of the choices of others would subordinate everyone 
else to that person’s choice.”5  A system of equal freedom instead guarantees only that 
each person is free from being compelled by others to advance another’s purpose (you 
can’t force me to do your grocery shopping).   
In this way, freedom is understood to be an inherent right of human beings to not 
be constrained by the choices of another, such that every other individual is free in the 
same way (the condition of equal freedom).  However, as Ripstein explains Kant’s 
argument, this freedom cannot be realized in the absence of public institutions: 
[A] system of private right without a public authority is morally 
incoherent, because the conceptual requirements of private right – the 
security of possession, clear boundaries between “mine and thine,” and the 
acquisition of property – cannot be satisfied without a public authority 
entitled to make, apply, and enforce laws.6 
 
It is not just that public institutions, capable of making and enforcing binding decisions 
on everyone, make rightful freedom more likely; they are in fact necessary to ensure this 
freedom.   
Public institutions address three conditions for the realization of freedom that the 
state of nature would not.  First is the ability to acquire property: “Although a person 
acquiring an object does so on his or her own initiative without consulting others, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid., 39. 
 
6 Ibid., 23. 
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power to do so requires an omnilateral will to make the unilateral act binding on others.”7  
Your right to acquire property is meaningless unless it places an obligation upon 
everyone else to respect your acquisition and not instead use that particular item for their 
own purposes, or dispose of it, etc.  A public authority serves to authorize unilateral 
acquisitions on behalf of everyone else, ensuring the freedom to acquire property. 
Second after the acquisition of property is the security of possession.  Without a 
system of public enforcement to which everyone is obligated to adhere, you would have 
no assurance that your rights would remain intact.  No individual could be sure that 
others would refrain from interfering with her property, and thus, in accordance with 
universal law, would not be obligated to refrain from interfering with the property of 
others.   
The third condition that must be addressed by public institutions is determinacy of 
rights – even if rights can be acquired and are enforceable, there may sometimes emerge 
disputes over the specific boundaries between property or some other particulars of 
rights.  If two people in good faith disagree on the practical application of the concept of 
rights, again under the provision of universal law neither has an obligation to yield to the 
other, until judgment from a public institution resolves the indeterminacy. 
 Thus it is in these ways that public institutions with decision-making and 
enforcement abilities make conclusive property rights feasible, and individuals are able to 
exercise the right to freedom consistent with universal law.  The state acts on behalf of its 
citizens as a collective body, and makes it possible for all individuals to interact on terms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 150. 
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of equal freedom.  However, these powers do not suggest that the state can come to hold 
limitless power:  
The key to the Kantian analysis is that the state, acting on behalf of 
citizens as a collective body, has legitimate powers that neither individual 
citizens nor any group of them have apart from it… the only way the state 
could have these powers is if they can be regarded and exercised on behalf 
of the citizens, and that requirement in turn is understood in terms of the 
possibility of the citizens giving such laws to themselves.8 
 
While the state can come to have powers private individuals do not, it cannot, for 
example, subject one individual to the whims of another.  It must act on behalf of the 
public in accordance with the omnilateral will, consistently with humanity’s innate right 
to choose which purposes to purse and with the condition of equal freedom. 
 What kinds of powers, then, might the state legitimately hold apart from 
enforcement powers?  Ripstein uses the example of public roads to show how the state 
may be obligated to act in order to protect freedom.  Imagine that all land was held 
privately by individuals – I alone am entitled to determine what happens on my plot, and 
each of my neighbors has the same entitlement, which includes the right to say who 
enters their land.  Thus, in order to get to any other piece of land (unless it happens to 
border mine), I need the permission of all those whose property I will cross in order to 
arrive at my destination.   
The problem, Ripstein argues, is not that my neighbors can exercise their rights 
such that I can’t do something I wish to do; this restriction of options is generally the case 
with private property.  Rather, the problem is that my neighbors are able to block me 
entirely from having interactions with others.  Regardless of my specific purpose in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., 243. 
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interacting with someone else, I must first secure permission from however many 
landowners exist between me and my destination.  Even if all individuals in my 
surrounding area are nice, understanding people who do permit me to cross their land 
whenever I wish, it is still true that my general ability of association is conditional upon 
the choice of others to let me cross their land.  In order to reconcile private property with 
freedom – here the freedom of individuals to voluntarily interact with whomever they 
wish, without being subject to the choice of others – the state must institute a system of 
public roads. 
 More generally, just as public institutions are justified in acting on behalf of all 
individuals in cases of enforcement, there exist other conditions of freedom that the state 
is obligated to protect through public provision.  While taxation for anything other than a 
public purpose would be a violation of the freedom of citizens, a tax on private activities 
in order to fund a public purpose such as the cost of building and maintaining roads is 
justifiable state action.  Individuals may be compelled by the state to contribute to these 
social projects, because to abstain would be taking advantage of the cooperative efforts of 
others to sustain a condition of private freedom for all – everyone else would be justified 
in claiming that they were being required to work for the purposes of the free rider. 
 What implications does Kant and Ripstein’s account of liberty have for health?  
That universal public healthcare may be beneficial for society but generates a free-rider 
problem is not sufficient to compel the entire public to contribute to its production; only 
those things which are necessary for equal freedom can be considered legitimate public 
purposes.  However, as Ripstein points out, the state is necessary to preserve the 
condition of equal freedom; the protection of public health is necessary to preserve the 
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state.  The state’s mandate to see to its own preservation thus justifies health as a public 
purpose, to which all citizens can be required to contribute. 
 Furthermore, this account of liberty produces a general obligation upon the state 
to support the poor, even if this requires a redistribution of wealth among citizens.  It is 
true that the innate freedom of individuals means that no person has a legitimate claim 
that any specific person accommodate to their purposes, even in cases of need (such as 
the purpose of staying alive).  However, the characteristics of the state – that it can act on 
behalf of all citizens in ways that private individuals cannot, though it is only able to 
make agreements that individuals would have been able to make for themselves – require 
the state to provide a certain level of provision.   
 Ripstein, using the example of property ownership, shows why no individual 
could authorize a state that does not provide for basic needs.  If in the state, a person 
owns no land, he is dependent on the choices of others to do something as basic as merely 
occupy space – he has contributed to an omnilateral will that has made land rights 
enforceable, which has thus eradicated his capacity to set and pursue his own purposes 
because he needs permission from others to even stand anywhere. (In the absence of 
public institutions and enforceable property rights, one would not need permission.)  
While the state is required to enforce property rights through public institutions, 
these institutions also necessarily must preserve the freedom of individuals: “The 
omnilateral will’s power to make law is restricted by the laws the people could give 
themselves; they could not authorize a situation in which some are completely beholden 
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to the choice of another.”9  Someone who is dependent on the private charity of others to 
meet even their basic needs is no longer free.  Thus the innate right of individuals to 
freedom makes any system of enforceable rights illegitimate, unless it also protects them 
from becoming dependent upon the choices of others in order to pursue their purposes.  
My entitlement to exclude others from my property is consistent with equal freedom only 
if there also exist provisions, through taxation, that protect others from being dependent 
upon my choices by providing for their basic needs.   
 Ripstein further argues that this redistribution by the state is not limited to 
providing for biological survival; the appropriate level of provision to be guaranteed 
depends on the features of a particular society.  In the matter of health: “[I]f illness and 
medical expenses regularly lead citizens to fall into conditions of dependency, a state can 
act proactively to provide publicly funded universal health care.”10  Public healthcare is 
thereby justified on two counts– in providing it, the state ensures equal freedom by acting 
in its own preservation, and by preventing individuals from becoming dependent on 
others to pursue their purposes. 
 The account of liberty, given by Kant and Ripstein, holds that freedom is only 
plausible on the condition of equal freedom, which gives rise to public institutions as 
necessary for preserving the ability of individuals to pursue their own purposes without 
being subject to the choices of others.  The state is thus able to act in ways that private 
individuals cannot, though it can only create laws that individuals would able to agree to 
themselves, and it must always act on behalf of the public.  The condition of equal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid., 279. 
 
10 Ibid., 285. 
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freedom requires the state to not only create institutions of enforcement, but also provide 
through taxation for other things necessary to realize freedom, whether with specific 
programs like public roads, or a general protection against dependency through a 
provision of all basic needs, both of which include public healthcare.   
  Other theories of justice that also emphasize individual liberty come to very 
different conclusions.  Notably, libertarian philosophy gives a different account of 
ownership rights, arguing that they are inviolable even in the face of state action – the 
state is no different from an agreement made up of private individuals for private 
purposes, and thus has no ability to take the property of citizens through taxation for 
provisions on behalf of the public.  While Kant and Ripstein hold that liberty cannot be 
plausible without the condition of equal freedom, and that the state must necessarily have 
distinctive powers as well as certain obligations in order to preserve this condition, the 
libertarian begins instead with the idea that rightful ownership precludes tax obligations 
to the state.  The next chapter grants this libertarian conception of inviolable rights of 
ownership, and considers its implications. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE LIBERTARIAN APPROACH TO LIBERTY THROUGH INVIOLABLE  
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS 
 
 The libertarian account of liberty begins, similarly to the Kantian approach, with 
the distinction between positive and negative rights and duties.  Some philosophers argue 
that we have positive duties to others – an obligation of action.  Someone having a 
positive right to X must correlate with a positive duty upon someone else to provide him 
or her with X (for example, a right to eat and a duty to provide food).  A negative duty, 
on the other hand, is one of inaction – these correspond with negative rights (for 
example, a right not to be killed or coerced). 
 The libertarian perspective on individual liberty views negative rights and duties 
as the only legitimate ones.  I am free in my person and possessions because everyone 
else has an obligation not to interfere.  Libertarians will frequently adopt from John 
Locke, a 17th century philosopher, his description of the state of nature: “a state of perfect 
freedom [of individuals] to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and 
persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature,”1 which requires that 
“being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 1690, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1980), 8 (sec. 4). 
 17 
or possessions.”2  Fundamentally, every individual has freedom in terms of his own 
person and property, except as he is constrained by the corresponding duty not to harm 
the person and property of others.   
 For Locke, the origin of these rights – to liberty of one’s life, health, liberty, and 
possessions –is somewhat ambiguous, but appears to arise from the essential nature of 
man and the intentions of the Creator; as part of His workmanship, all individuals are 
equal in their responsibility to carry out His business, and to not interfere with others as 
they do the same.  Others have discussed more in-depth why these absolute, inviolable 
individual liberties are at the center of their moral philosophy without the same religious 
appeal.  Ayn Rand argues that individual rights derive their extreme importance from the 
fact that man’s nature and indeed survival depend on reason, and reason is meaningless 
without the capacity to choose how one will live.3 
Robert Nozick, a modern libertarian, looks at traditional proposals for why 
humans are deserving of these rights, such as rationality, free will, and moral agency, and 
proposes that these ideas really all add up to something more significant: “the ability to 
regulate and guide [one’s] life in accordance with some overall conception [one] chooses 
to accept.”4  The kinds of goals we make for ourselves, and the kinds of experiences we 
value, indicate the importance of agency in our existence.  When presented with the 
option to forgo our lives in favor of a hypothetical machine that can simulate any 
experience, many of us would choose not to use it – it would not satisfy our desire to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ibid., 9 (sec. 6). 
 
3 Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen, “Ayn Rand on Rights and Capitalism,” 
in The Libertarian Reader, ed. David Boaz (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 170-1.   
 
4 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974), 49. 
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actively live.  Self-ownership is morally relevant because it is grounded in the 
complicated question of the meaning of life: “A person’s shaping his life in accordance 
with some overall plan is his way of giving meaning to his life; only a being with the 
capacity to so shape his life can have or strive for meaningful life.”5  (We see here that, 
unlike the account of liberty given in the previous chapter, libertarianism presents this 
meaning of life as completely satisfied by self-ownership, and not qualified by the 
condition of equal freedom). 
 Full self-ownership is considered to comprise the maximal set of ownership 
rights: over my self, I have maximal control rights over the use of my person; right to 
compensation if someone violates my control rights without permission; right to 
enforcement to prevent others from or extract compensation from others for violations; 
right to transfer these rights to others (by gift or sale, for example); and immunity to the 
nonconsensual loss of any of these other rights.6  Implied by this explicit set are other 
rights, such as the right to income generated by the exercise of any of the above. 
The libertarian views full self-ownership as imposing moral obligations of 
inaction upon others: not to kill you, harm you, or steal from you what is rightfully yours.  
These negative rights thus serve to fully limit, or constrain, the actions of others – the 
constraints that protect liberty, or full self-ownership, are prioritized as inviolable, even 
against the state or in the face of high goals such as the ‘social good.’  Nozick 
acknowledges that individuals will sometimes make sacrifices in order to obtain some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid., 50. 
 
6 Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka, “Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not 
Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 2 
(March 2005), 203-4. 
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greater benefit (he uses the example of going to the dentist now, in order to prevent later 
worse suffering), but continues: 
Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that 
benefit other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good?  But 
there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its 
own good.  There are only individual people… Using one of those people 
for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits others.  Nothing more… 
Talk of an overall social good covers this up.7 
 
Because the individual making the sacrifice is not the individual who benefits, even 
redistributions for the public good are unacceptable; the libertarian holds in all cases that 
negative rights constrain action, regardless of whether it is private or state action, and 
redistribution for redistributive purposes is never legitimate. 
 What kinds of property can individuals come to own, apart from the self?  The 
answer to this question is essential for understanding what kinds of things the constraints 
preserving individual rights will actually protect.  Left-libertarians, such as Peter 
Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka, generally hold that while individuals 
have full self-ownership, the only defensible, coherent theory for natural resources is 
some form of common or egalitarian ownership.  By extension, artifacts can only be 
rightfully owned by an individual if he rightfully came to own all of the resources 
involved in production.  Hearkening back to Locke, who holds that natural resources can 
only become someone’s property if “there is enough, and as good, left in common for 
others,”8 left-libertarianism asserts that this Lockean proviso can only be plausibly 
interpreted to mean that no individual can freely appropriate natural resources.  
Intuitively, this interpretation makes greater sense in the modern world with a population 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Nozick, 32-3. 
 
8 Locke, 19 (sec. 27).  
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nearing 7 million – what plot of land could I appropriate that would leave enough for 
everyone else to do the same? – than perhaps it did in an ideal time of boundless 
available land and resources.   
Logically too, however, we can see how working backwards would prevent free 
appropriation even in times of apparent plenty.  As Nozick explains: 
Consider the first person Z for whom there is not enough and as good left 
to appropriate.  The last person Y to appropriate left Z without his 
previous liberty to act on an object, and so worsened Z’s situation.  So Y’s 
appropriation is not allowed under Locke’s proviso… And so on back to 
the first person A to appropriate a permanent property right.9 
 
Any appropriation of natural resources, even if there is enough and as good still left at the 
time, restricts the ability of subsequent individuals from doing the same.  Thus no one has 
the ability to appropriate resources without making a compensatory payment to the 
commons.  (Nozick finds this reading implausible precisely because it cannot support 
free appropriation of natural resources and thus proposes a less strict interpretation, as we 
will see later).  
The proposals for ways in which natural resources can be owned in an egalitarian 
manner are almost as numerous as the left-libertarians themselves; however, there are 
several essential themes among these theories.  Primarily, a conception of ownership for 
natural resources must keep self-ownership reasonably secure.  I should be able to use 
natural resources – breathe air and stand in space – without first asking permission of 
others, or putting my self-ownership on the line.  A corollary to this requirement is that 
no one can use natural resources in a way that violates the self-ownership of others; I 
can’t chop down a tree and use it to kill you.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Nozick, 176. 
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 Furthermore, many theories of natural resource ownership include guidelines for 
‘fair use,’ and/or unilateral appropriation.  The former would restrict the ways in which 
one can use natural resources further than just by the self-ownership of others – perhaps 
to exclude the continued possession of a unique resource, as an example.  While some 
branches of left-libertarianism hold that none of the resources held in common may be 
appropriated without consent of all others, the generally accepted concept of unilateral 
appropriation provides for individuals to not just use, but appropriate (currently un-
appropriated) resources without undergoing the likely near-impossible task of first 
obtaining consent, though an according payment is usually necessary.  Unilateral 
appropriation thus serves first to allow individuals to functionally exercise their shared 
ownership of natural resources without, for example, getting unanimous agreement.  
Second, unilateral appropriation ensures that the benefits reaped from these equally 
owned natural resources are paid back to the commons, to be distributed in an egalitarian 
manner as well. 
 How we determine the payment due for unilateral acquisition is a very 
challenging question. The most permissive theories include just the competitive value of 
the resources one has claimed – you couldn’t make a profit just by acquiring and reselling 
the rights to a resource, though you could sell what you produce from resources and your 
own labor at a presumably profitable price.  From there, the theories become more 
egalitarian.  A ‘full-benefit-taxation’ conception of natural resource ownership holds that 
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appropriators of natural resources must pay taxes of up to 100% on all subsequent 
benefits they reap.10   
 Another key element of these egalitarian natural resource ownership conceptions 
(that differs from those of right-libertarians) is the subsequent creation of a social fund, 
representative of the value of the natural resources.  Payments under the left-libertarian’s 
system for natural resources are also equally owned, raising the question of how this fund 
is to be fairly spent.  Some left-libertarians endorse equal shares for all individuals; others 
would divide the fund such that each individual got an equal gain in (some defined notion 
of) well-being from their share, taking into account that the spending opportunities of 
individuals depend heavily on their circumstances; yet others would spend the fund in 
pursuit of equality of opportunity for well-being for everyone. 
 Though the diversity among left-libertarian philosophies on many important 
subjects may appear overwhelming, as a set they do address some coherent, interesting 
ideas.  In summary, left-libertarianism generally holds that while individuals have full 
self-ownership, natural resources are owned in an egalitarian way – thus any individual 
appropriating natural resources must make a payment of the value of what he has 
appropriated, which will be spent in some egalitarian fashion as well. 
 Right-libertarians, such as Nozick, argue that taxation is a violation of individual 
rights, the equivalent to slavery:  
Whether it is done through taxation on wages or on wages over a certain 
amount, or through seizure of profits, or through there being a big social 
pot so that it’s not clear what’s coming from where and what’s going 
where, patterned principles of distributive justice involve appropriating the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Peter Vallentyne, “Left-Libertarianism: A Primer,” in Left-Libertarianism and Its 
Critics: The Contemporary Debate, ed. Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (New York: Palgrave 
Publishers Ltd., 2000), 9. 
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actions of other persons.  Seizing the results of someone’s labor is 
equivalent to seizing hours from him and directing him to carry on various 
activities.11 
 
Just as it would be a violation of self-ownership to force an individual to do work for you 
as a slave, the argument goes, taxing the results of his work is the same kind of violation.  
A right-libertarian, observing the taxes levied by the left-libertarians and the collection of 
the social fund, would protest a huge violation of individual liberty. 
 As Barbara Fried points out, the jump from protecting full self-ownership to 
prohibiting all kinds of taxation is perhaps a little too far and quick to be believable. 
[S]uch questions as “But might there be some reasons why we would 
condemn forcibly removing someone’s kidney or sticking a knife in 
someone’s back that don’t necessarily carry over to the state’s imposing 
an ad valorem property tax?” are simply treated as longwinded rhetorical 
questions to which the only possible answer is “no”… [T]he Nozickean 
argument seizes on one formal likeness between taxation and slavery, 
disregarding all the differences in the degree and kind of constraints 
imposed by the two that do not merely weaken the analogy but may defeat 
it entirely.12  
 
The ways in which taxation might to a limited degree affect the autonomy of an 
individual’s labor choices do not, Fried argues, automatically characterize slavery.   
 The left-libertarian, however, has a much stronger claim.  The taxation of the 
value of natural resources is not a compromise of autonomy that just happens to be in a 
different class than the kind of compromise that happens in cases of slavery.  Rather, 
taxation of the value of natural resources is not at all an infringement on full self-
ownership, because this value never properly belonged to the individual being taxed in 
the first place.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Nozick, 172. 
 
12 Barbara H. Fried, “Left-Libertarianism: A Review Essay,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 
32, no. 1 (January 2004), 71, 80.   
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The left-libertarian shares the emphasis on moral constraints on action.  The 
question of how the benefits of the world are to be divided must be secondary to the 
question of what kinds of actions are permissible or impermissible, given the inviolability 
of individuals.  It is an essential distinction that no individual is obligated to pay a tax to 
the social fund just by virtue of existing, or for using unappropriated natural resources – 
only by choosing to appropriate resources does one become obligated to make a payment.  
Moreover, no methods of promoting equality are acceptable that violate the rights of 
individuals in their person: “agents may not be killed, tortured, or assaulted without their 
consent if they have committed no past injustices.  Nor may they be coerced into 
providing involuntary services for others (e.g. mandatory labor).”13  Just process must be 
ensured prior to – and is in fact necessary for – just outcomes.  The difference for the left-
libertarian is merely that if natural resources are owned in an egalitarian fashion, fewer 
constraints apply.   
 Thus the taxation and creation of the social fund is distinct from the types of 
redistribution generally endorsed by egalitarians and protested by libertarians, because it 
represents the value of the natural resources owned in common – no individual is justly 
entitled to take the value for himself, and the due payment represents his compensation to 
others for this appropriation.  To appropriate natural resources without making such a 
payment would be illegitimate theft from the commons, a violation of the rights of all 
other individuals. 
 Some have criticized left-libertarianism as failing to provide meaningful 
protection to individual rights.  Barbara Fried argues that the left-libertarians construe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Vallentyne, “Left-Libertarianism: A Primer,” 9. 
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self-ownership so narrowly, and what is owned in common so broadly, that they produce 
“suspicions that left-libertarianism is just liberal egalitarianism in drag.”14  While left-
libertarianism does still provide constraints on permissible action, Fried points out that, at 
least in some variations, “the only forms of state power that it would prohibit (stealing 
others’ eyeballs, enslaving them) are ones that no sane government would 
contemplate.”15  Amongst realistic options, and especially in the area of taxation and 
distribution of the social fund, left-libertarianism comes out much more left than it does 
libertarian. 
 Once we have begun to divide goods into the ‘fruit’s of one’s labor’ component 
that is inviolable as part of full self-ownership, and the value from natural resources 
component that is taxable, arriving at Otsaka’s conclusion that only things like a shirt that 
one weaves out of one’s own hair are protected from taxation becomes a very realistic 
possibility.16  On the other side, natural resources can be construed very broadly, even to 
include individual talents or genetic differences.17  When one includes the possibility to 
distribute the social fund differentially according to existing inequalities – where those 
with less opportunity or fewer talents can be given a larger share of the fund – it is 
unclear whether left-libertarianism functionally differs in terms of individuals’ rights 
from an egalitarian theory. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Fried, 85. 
 
15 Barbara H. Fried, “Left-Libertarianism, Once More: A Rejoinder to Vallentyne, 
Steiner, and Otsuka,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 2 (March 2005): 219-20. 
 
16 Fried, “Left-Libertarianism: A Review Essay,” 83. 
 
17 Ibid., 86. 
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 The left-libertarian responds, however, by pointing out that not only are full self-
ownership and egalitarian ownership of natural resources perfectly compatible principles, 
but in fact the latter is the most plausible reading of the proviso.  Vallentyne, Steiner and 
Otsuka write: 
Left-libertarianism holds that there is a very significant difference in the 
moral status of agents (self-directing beings with full moral standing) and 
natural resources (resources that have no moral standing…).  About the 
former they maintain that full self-ownership is the most appropriate 
reflection of the status… and about the latter they independently maintain 
that egalitarian ownership is the most defensible stance.18 [emphasis mine] 
 
There is nothing inherent in self-ownership that implies or guarantees any entitlement to 
natural resources or the value they contribute to produced artifacts.  Furthermore, any 
other reading of the proviso would allow for violations of liberty by permitting some 
individuals to disadvantage others through the free appropriation of resources. 
 What impact would embracing left-libertarianism have on healthcare?  While the 
exact outcomes would depend on the particular form of left-libertarianism, the premise 
that natural resources are owned collectively would undoubtedly have a great capacity for 
improving overall health, and overall access to healthcare, in a society.  The social fund, 
created by monetizing the value of appropriated natural resources, would ensure that the 
benefits of resources were distributed equally across society.  Material inequality would 
most likely still exist for reasons other than profitable appropriation of natural resources; 
for example, individuals would probably make different choices about how to spend or 
invest their money (except under the most extreme cases of left-libertarianism, where 
even inequalities in genetic differences like spending habits may be accounted for and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka, 209. 
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equalized).  However, with even fairly conservative left-libertarianism, the distribution of 
assets across society would undoubtedly be much more equal than they are today.   
It is not obvious that under left-libertarianism, anyone could be compelled to 
spend their money on healthcare.  However, for the many individuals for whom adequate 
– or even minimum-level – healthcare is currently unaffordable, access to their share of 
the value of natural resources via the social fund would serve to at least increase their 
opportunities.  With greater material equality, more people would be able to make more 
positive choices about their health.  Furthermore, among people who are able to afford 
adequate healthcare but choose instead to allocate their money elsewhere, receiving their 
share of the social fund may encourage some to begin doing so (the marginal utility of 
spending this money on healthcare would be greater than the increase in utility spending 
it elsewhere).  In all probability, left-libertarianism in action would have a positive 
impact on access to healthcare. 
Thus even an account of liberty that does not include a condition to equal freedom 
does in some ways give rise to a certain amount of equality.  The left-libertarian contends 
that though self-ownership is inviolable, the only coherent understanding of natural 
resources and the Lockean proviso is one that holds natural resources as owned in an 
egalitarian fashion, thereby requiring a compensatory payment from anyone who wishes 
to appropriate resources back to the commons.  Right-libertarians, on the other hand, 
protest this interpretation of the proviso precisely because it prevents individuals from 
freely appropriating natural resources – something that the right-libertarian prioritizes as 
necessary in a theory of justice.  For the sake of argument, the next chapter accepts the 
right-libertarian interpretation of the proviso.
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CHAPTER III 
THE RIGHT-LIBERTARIAN READING OF THE PROVISO AND THEORY OF 
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
 
 While right-libertarians such as Robert Nozick reject the stringent reading of the 
Lockean proviso exactly because it prevents individuals from freely appropriating natural 
resources, they do maintain that the proviso carries weight.  The weaker reading does not 
cover any disadvantage to others from no longer being able to appropriate as before, but 
does prevent appropriation such that there is no longer enough and as good for others to 
freely use as before.  Under this reading, there can be some legitimate appropriation of 
natural resources, as long as it is not so extensive as to limit the ability of others to use 
this kind of resource – an individual may appropriate a water source for himself, for 
example, as long as he does not appropriate all of the available water sources.   
 To the libertarian, on both the left and the right, the liberties in one’s person and 
property that are taken to be constraints on action (both private and state) rule out the 
possibility of redistribution – to redistribute resources or wealth across a group or society 
is a violation of the rights of those from whom something is taken (their right to choose 
how their money is spent, for example).  We cannot simply take the rightful property of 
the wealthy and give it to the poor.  If we grant the right-libertarian’s interpretation of the 
Lockean proviso, however, the amount and type of property to which an individual may 
justifiably be entitled expands dramatically. 
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 What are then the relevant rules for guiding property ownership?  Nozick 
summarizes his neo-Lockean theory of justice in holdings as follows: 
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of 
justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of 
justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is 
entitled to the holding. 
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 
and 2.1 
 
Thus the question of whether or not a person is entitled to a ‘holding,’ or some item or 
wealth, depends solely on whether or not his or her process of acquiring it abided by two 
principles: the principle of justice in acquisition, and the principle of justice in transfer.  
The former describes how unheld things may come to be held; the latter describes how 
held things may be transferred from one person to another.  While a complete account of 
either of these two principles will necessarily be quite complicated, generally we can 
describe what the principles might look like. Voluntary exchange and gift-giving would 
in most circumstances qualify as legitimate transfers – theft or coerced exchange (forced 
redistribution for purely redistributive purposes) would not, because these would violate 
an individual’s rights of ownership.   
 The requirements set by the proviso obviously apply to the principle of 
acquisition, setting the rule for when unheld things can come to be held.  Thus we can see 
here how the weaker reading of the proviso dramatically departs from left-libertarianism; 
the principle of acquisition considers natural resources, in this reading, to be generally 
unheld and able to be appropriated freely by individuals as long as no others are 
disadvantaged in their ability to use similar resources.  Furthermore, the proviso so read 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974), 151. 
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has additional applications to the principle of transfer.  Just as I cannot justifiably 
appropriate all of the water sources in the first place, I can neither purchase all of the 
water sources from others, nor can I continue to legitimately hold my water sources if all 
the others dry up.   
Additionally, this requirement does not just fall upon a single individual who has 
appropriated all of a resource; the proviso “excludes [an individual] transferring [his 
holding] into an agglomeration that does violate the Lockean proviso and excludes his 
using it in a way, in coordination with others or independently of them, so as to violate 
the proviso by making the situation of others worse than their baseline situation.”2  Even 
if I would otherwise have an entitlement to a holding under the principles of acquisition 
and transfer, if exercise of my ownership of it disadvantages others in their access to 
resources, I cannot justifiably be so entitled.   
 Thus the question of whether or not a particular distribution of holdings – how 
wealth or resources are distributed among individuals – is derived from the process by 
which the distribution came about.  If I steal an item, violating the principle of justice in 
transfer, I am not entitled to it, nor would I be entitled to anything I might trade or sell the 
item for.  Just distributions can only come to be if the previous distribution was just, and 
the process by which the new distribution occurred was also just.  One challenge of this 
type of entitlement theory is, as Nozick points out, “That from a just situation a situation 
could have arisen via justice-preserving means does not suffice to show its justice.  The 
fact that a thief’s victims voluntarily could have presented him with gifts does not entitle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ibid., 180. 
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the thief to his ill-gotten gains.”3  An examination of a current distribution scheme is not 
sufficient to assess whether or not it is a just one. 
 However, as Roderick Long holds, historical entitlement theories also have an 
advantage in how strongly they expose the roots of inequalities: 
Merely pointing to the fact that some people have a lot more than others is 
less compelling as a critique; it invites the response “So what?  Those who 
have more aren’t hurting anybody; you’re just appealing to envy.” By 
contrast, being able to show that those who enjoy a higher socioeconomic 
status have to a considerable extent achieved and maintained that status by 
forcibly expropriating and oppressing the less affluent provides for a far 
more effective indictment.4 
 
This is not to say that all inequalities are prima facie due to violation of the principles of 
acquisition and transfer.  Rather, the historical entitlement theory separates inequalities 
into two categories: those that have come to be in a just fashion, and those that have not.  
In the former, the property rights of those who have greater shares of resources or wealth 
must be protected, because they have acquired them legitimately.  In the latter, it is 
absolutely clear that those with greater shares have acquired them at the expense of 
others, they are definitively not entitled to protection of (all) their holdings, and the 
current distribution of holdings is an unjust one. 
 What happens in these situations, when an individual is not justly entitled to some 
or another of her holdings?  Nozick refers to the principle of rectification, which would 
describe how violations of the principles of acquisition and transfer must be remedied.  
While there are certainly numerous complicating factors to resolve among many cases 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid., 151-2. 
 
4 Roderick T. Long, “Left-Libertarianism, Class Conflict, and Historical Theories of 
Distributive Justice,” unpublished manuscript, Auburn University (2010), available from 
http://praxeology.net/historical-justice.pdf, accessed 22 November 2012, 13. 
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(“How, if at all, do things change if the beneficiaries and those made worse off are not 
the direct parties in the act of injustice, but, for example their descendants? …How far 
back must one go in wiping clean the historical slate of injustices?”5), generally speaking 
the victim of a rights violation will need to be compensated, by the perpetrator, up to the 
point where he would have been had the injustice not occurred.6  This principle of 
rectification for the right-libertarian is similar to the payments owed for appropriation of 
any natural resources under the left-libertarian scheme insofar as they are both legitimate 
forms of redistribution.  The important distinction for the libertarian is whether the 
redistribution is meant to compensate for an injustice, or if it meant to adjust away from a 
just distribution in favor of a differed desired pattern (a more equal one, for example).  
While redistribution for redistributive purposes is unacceptable, redistribution for non-
redistributive purposes is fine, and moreover required. 
 Both the proviso so read, as well as the conception of compensation in cases 
where one has violated another’s person or property rights carry real weight in this theory 
of justice, and will be relevant to all aspects of society, including our system of 
healthcare.  Having granted the libertarian account of liberty; even granting the limited 
right-libertarian interpretation of the proviso – where does this leave us in terms of 
health?   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Nozick, 152. 
 
6 It is not sufficient to merely return the value of what was unjustly taken: “The principle 
of rectification presumably will make use of its best estimate in subjunctive information about 
what would have occurred (or a probability distribution over what might have occurred, using the 
expected value) if the injustice had not taken place.  If the actual description of holdings turns out 
not to be one of the descriptions yielded by the principle, then one of the descriptions yielded 
must be realized.” (Ibid., 152-3). 
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Though the Lockean proviso, as interpreted by the right-libertarian, certainly 
continues to apply to situations of health and healthcare, it is unlikely that it would 
require the institution of substantial changes to our healthcare system.  The proviso so 
understood prevents individuals or groups from acting such that others generally fall 
below the Lockean baseline.  Estimating such a baseline, the position comparable to 
where everything is enough and as good, is a difficult task.  Free access to materials and 
land is not common today, making it a challenge to estimate how much wealth one would 
be able to generate with such access.  
Nozick generally equates the baseline to “the general economic importance of 
original appropriation,” and suggests: 
Perhaps this importance can be measured by the percentage of all income 
that is based upon untransformed raw materials and given resources 
(rather than upon human actions), mainly rental income representing the 
unimproved value of the land, and the price of raw material in situ, and by 
the percentage of current wealth which represents such income in the 
past… David Friedman… suggests 5 percent of U.S. National Income as 
an upper limit for the first two factors mentioned.  However he does not 
attempt to estimate the percentage of current wealth which is based upon 
such income in the past.7 
 
With an estimated GDP per capita of $48,300 in 2011, Friedman’s estimate likely would 
not exceed $2,500 as a yearly income that would be equivalent to the baseline situation.8  
A more precise calculation than the one presented here of what this economic baseline 
entails is undeniably a worthwhile project.  Anyone found to be below this estimated 
baseline would be entitled to due compensation up to that point.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 177 and footnote *. 
 
8 CIA World Factbook, “United States,” available from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html, accessed 28 
November 2012. 
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Upon whom would the obligation be to compensate these people who are found to 
have fallen below the baseline?  Under the conditions of the proviso, all those who have 
appropriated or acquired through transfer natural resources, or used their holdings in a 
way that contributed to the fall of others below the baseline face an obligation of 
compensation – likely equivalent to everyone else in the U.S.  A very modest tax on all 
individuals above the baseline condition would serve to properly compensate those who 
had been previously disadvantaged. 
 There is likely additional ground that must be guaranteed in terms of the health 
benefits that arise from baseline access to natural resources.  Before the private 
appropriation and development of natural resources, when there was enough and as good, 
individuals had a certain level of access to raw, naturally growing foods, and water free 
of contaminants from other humans.  It is an empirical question as to how many 
Americans currently lack this access and must be compensated. However, there are 
measures across the nation to ensure potable drinking water, and the U.S. government 
spent almost $77 billion in food assistance in 2011, serving more than 46 million people.9  
The framework exists already in the U.S., through federal taxes and programs, to provide 
approximations of the baseline situation to those who would otherwise be below it. 
While the Lockean proviso surely carries significant weight in terms of global health, 
with millions of people living below the economic baseline situation as well as, more 
seriously, lacking basic food and water access, the changes it demands on the health 
system in the U.S. are most likely minor. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Program Information Report (Keydata): U.S. 
Summary, FY 2011 – FY 2012,” available from http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/key_data/march-
2012.xlsx, accessed 23 November 2012.  
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 The question of what implications the libertarian understanding of compensation 
requires from our healthcare system is a more complicated one.  I will examine four 
categories of compensation that may be relevant to health: compensation for injustices 
generally, compensation in cases of direct harm between individuals, compensation in 
cases of harm due to activity on the societal level, and compensation as a consequence of 
the reduction of risk.  1) General overdue compensations.  Are there individuals or groups 
against whom rights violations have been committed but not compensated for?  In the 
U.S., the large-scale historical injustices perpetrated against African-Americans and 
Native Americans have never been thoroughly subject to the principle of rectification.  
The fact that a calculation of how extensive the injustices were and what impact they 
have had on today’s distribution of holdings is extremely complicated does not relieve us 
of our obligation to compensate.  The prompt compensation to those who have been 
subject to past rights violations, may in some cases make the difference in being able to 
afford healthcare. 
 The next category of possible compensation is 2) direct compensation, due to 
those who have had their health worsened by another – people who need care because 
they have been hit by cars or shot by guns, etc.  When one individual has worsened the 
health of another, whether as an accident or an act of violence, the individual at fault is 
required to pay full compensation, which would presumably include not only the cost of 
healthcare, but additional compensation for the economic loss due to any short or long-
term disability as well as pain and suffering.10   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 There remains the question of whether financial payments can actually fully 
compensate for harm, especially in the realm of health – is there any amount that can make 
amends for losing an arm; losing your sense of sight; life-long illnesses; death?  The libertarian 
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Our current legal framework generally requires these types of payments already.  
However, we must examine the extent to which this requirement is functionally being 
met.  First, there is the question of access to the legal system, with cost as the most 
prominent barrier.  Ensuring that those who have already been disadvantaged by injury 
and cannot incur extremely expensive legal costs are actually able to make claims on and 
receive their due compensation is essential for achieving justice.  Presumably, the 
perpetrator must pay any costs of obtaining compensation; however, the investment of 
time and resources required to resolve a legal claim may currently be unacceptably 
prohibitive. 
Second, there is the issue of broadly distributed obligations of compensation.  If, 
for example, I get lung cancer due to second-hand smoke (or, perhaps, it is a matter of 
scientific consensus that my exposure to second-hand smoke significantly raised my 
chances of getting lung cancer by a certain percent), from whom can I reasonably seek 
compensation for my healthcare costs?  The process of litigating against every individual 
who smoked tobacco in my vicinity over my lifetime would be absurd; the benefit from 
litigating against just several contributing individuals would be far outweighed by the 
costs.  Even if it were absolutely clear who would be required to compensate me for what 
exact amounts, there are significant practical difficulties involved in actually procuring 
what I am owed that must be overcome in order to ensure justice.  
The third functional challenge of direct compensation is what might happen in 
cases where the perpetrator is unable to pay.  If I am hit by a reckless driver who has no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
claims that these kinds of injuries can all be made morally acceptable, as long as the proper 
payment is made.  In this paper I acquiesce to this assumption, though find it a compelling 
criticism of the libertarian framework as a whole. 
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wealth or property, how will I be compensated for my injuries?  Am I given instead a 
portion or period of ownership over this person – say, however many years of indentured 
servitude it will take him to properly compensate me?  The libertarian would find this 
compromise of self-ownership intolerable.  Consider the current system of requiring that 
all drivers have car insurance, such that an ability to pay for damages is ensured prior to 
being allowed into the streets.  Is this an acceptable form of state action over how 
individuals may allocate their wealth?  Would it still be acceptable to require general 
damages insurance to let anyone leave their homes, so that if they cause harm to another 
person or property we can be sure that they will be able to compensate?  
These questions of functionally ensuring the payment of compensation will 
obviously have implications for all areas of the libertarian perspective; however, they are 
particularly salient when discussing health, because of its inherent relationship to rights 
in one’s person.  While healthcare consists of more than responding to accidents or 
incidents of violence – damages caused by an individual to another’s person – it is vital to 
the libertarian framework to be able to effectively ensure compensation in such cases.  A 
coherent theory of justice must incorporate processes for guaranteeing compensation in 
cases of harm, even in the face of practical difficulties like those listed above.  (I suspect 
that these at least include a tax in order to cover the costs associated with enforcing 
compensation, as well as perhaps a form of mandatory insurance to account for cases 
where the individual at fault is unable to pay.) 
 Next we will evaluate 3) the category of compensation, due to an individual for 
worsening her health situation, but due from society as a whole.  For example, the 
widespread use of antibiotics by virtually all those who have participated in the system of 
 38 
modern medicine has given rise to antibiotic-resistant infections such as MRSA, which 
can quickly become very serious and even lethal.  Individuals who face these kinds of 
infections must be compensated for the additional care required, most plausibly by way 
of some modest general tax.11  While this type of situation may not be very common, it 
nonetheless establishes that some situations of worsened health are a consequence of 
societal action and must be compensated as such. 
The final category of compensation relevant to health is 4) compensation as a 
result of action taken to reduce risk.  To use Nozick’s example, allowing an epileptic to 
drive imposes a risk on everyone else – even if the epileptic would never have actually 
caused any accidents, the high probability that he might is problematic.  However, to 
prohibit him from driving on only the grounds that he might cause an accident is to 
seriously disadvantage him, and therefore all those who benefit (everyone else using 
roads) are required to compensate the epileptic for this disadvantage.12  The balance 
between these two concepts is highly contextual – not all risks will be worth the cost of 
compensating the disadvantaged, and not all restrictions require compensation (you don’t 
need to compensate someone for restricting their ability to play Russian roulette on you).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Alternatively, this obligation could be met through a tax on the specific institution, i.e. 
some kind of tax on the consumption of antibiotics.  (Similarly, this method of compensation 
could potentially be used to resolve the problem of second-hand smoking, by taxing tobacco 
products for the purposes of paying for the healthcare of affected individuals.)  Problematic to 
this strategy is that the relevant, specific taxes could only be levied ex post facto (once MRSA has 
been discovered).  A general tax to be used in every case where effectively all of society has 
contributed to the obligation resolves this issue, though may need to include some process by 
which an individual can demonstrate his independence from a particular obligation and be 
reimbursed. 
 
12 Nozick, 78-9.  
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In terms of health, this category of compensation has powerful implications.  An 
individual with a communicable disease presents a risk to everyone else he may come in 
contact with; they are justified in acting to mitigate this risk, as long as he is compensated 
for any disadvantage, most likely through a system of taxation.  In some cases, mitigating 
the risk may mean some limited forms of quarantine, though the value of the 
disadvantage would likely be quite high.  In other cases, however, everyone may elect to 
prevent risk of exposure by treating or curing the disease; this would usually incur very 
low costs of compensation, such as those resulting from side effects of treatment.  
Furthermore, preventative care is even warranted in circumstances where the cost of 
prevention is low enough to be worth addressing such a small risk (i.e. the risk that an 
individual will contract and then spread a disease).  In situations of communicable 
disease, care, treatment and even prevention can be justified as action taken to reduce 
risks of transmission to all others in society, as long as due compensation is paid. 
Under the right-libertarian reading of the proviso and account of property 
ownership, an overall system of public healthcare constitutes illegitimate redistribution of 
resources.  However, the effects that this theory of justice has on health are, as 
demonstrated, quite extensive.  Even the weaker interpretation of the proviso sets a 
baseline condition under which individuals cannot be situated, either in terms of 
economic circumstances or some specific matters that likely relate to health.  The rules 
regarding compensation also generate many obligations on a system of healthcare.  In 
addition to ensuring the general rectification of past injustices, a justifiable system must 
guarantee compensation to individuals in cases of direct harm by other individuals and by 
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society overall.  Moreover, compensation for disadvantage in cases of risk reduction 
allows for a wide range of methods for dealing with communicable disease. 
 These implications that right-libertarianism, properly understood, has for 
healthcare are not functionally equivalent to a publicly funded, universal system.  
Individuals would still be responsible for any self-inflicted harm to their health, naturally 
occurring accidents, the incidents of aging, etc., as well as disease under certain 
conditions of risk.  However, a consistent right-libertarian will hold that there are some 
important aspects of healthcare which are not individual matters, and are in fact 
circumstances of compensation that the state is obligated to enforce, sometimes through 
taxation.  Finally, as a practical matter, one side effect of the state fulfilling these 
obligations may be an increase in the affordability of health insurance.  As more 
instances of healthcare are understood as rightful compensation, insurance companies 
will expect to cover fewer instances themselves, bringing down the cost of health 
insurance and thereby increasing its accessibility. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 Common assertions of a right to healthcare ignore the question of individual 
liberty; appeals to liberty are commonly used to preclude a right to healthcare.  Starting 
from a perspective of liberty, this paper has extensively explored what kinds of 
obligations one individual has in terms of the health of another.  A plausible account of 
liberty requires a condition of equal freedom, which in turn demands a state to realize this 
freedom through public institutions – including a system of publicly funded healthcare.   
 Those who believe ownership is inviolable even to state action protest this 
account of liberty, properly understood.  But even if you grant them their account of 
liberty, a plausible interpretation of natural resources and the Lockean proviso restricts 
legitimate property ownership.  The resulting, fairly egalitarian, distribution of resources 
and wealth significantly promotes equal access to healthcare.  But even if you turn to 
those who read the proviso to allow for extensive property ownership, and grant them 
their interpretation and the necessary accompanying rules of compensation to prevent or 
rectify injustice, still there are important and substantial aspects of healthcare that the 
state is obligated to ensure.  Liberty may not give one an absolute positive right to 
healthcare; however, accounts of liberty from a range of perspectives all give rise to 
theories of justice that require substantial protections of health. 
 Perhaps there are those who wish to go one step further in the name of ‘liberty,’ 
and would contest even the right-libertarian’s claims that compensation can be used so 
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extensively, or as a method of restricting the actions of others in order to reduce risk.  
Such a position, however, would hold every individual to the absolute whim of every 
other.  Such a position is no longer consistent with a meaningful understanding of liberty; 
it is only consistent with the absurd. 
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